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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS past year, with the celebration of the twenty-first Earth
Day, concern for the environment has come of age. Nowhere
has this concern manifested itself as greatly as in the area of envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement, the government's most potent
weapon in seeking strict environmental compliance by business
and industry. As former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
announced two years ago, when speaking to the National District
Attorneys Association, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is "mov-
ing to an even-higher [sic] ground in [its] stand to defend the en-
vironment."' In January 1991, at a conference of more than 900
federal, state and local environmental law enforcement officials,
Thornburgh sounded a clarion call to save "the Blue Planet":
So let us resolve to take a more realistic, truly propor-
tional view of these grave offenses against the environ-
ment, and pursue white-collar environmental criminals
as vigorously as we have chased down other white-collar
rip-off artists. I do not exaggerate when I suggest that
the ultimate environmental damage to our earth from
t Joseph G. Block is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Venable,
Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti and practices in the firm's Environmental Group.
Mr. Block is the former Chief of Environmental Crimes Section in the Environ-
ment and Natural Resources Division of the Department ofJustice. The author
wishes to thank Nancy Voisin and Jonathan Mitchell for their assistance in pre-
paring this article.
1. See Former Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh, Address at Na-
tional Association of District Attorneys (July 19, 1989) (transcript on file with
author).
(33)
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too much criminal trespass-taken economically, leaving
aside other life consequences-will far outweigh any
half-trillion-dollar loss from the S & L debacle. 2
II. GROWTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The growth of the Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) at
DOJ demonstrates the rapid expansion of environmental criminal
enforcement efforts. The ECS began in the fall of 1982 as a
three-attorney unit within the civil Environmental Enforcement
Section. In May 1987, it became a separate section within the En-
vironment and Natural Resources Division of DOJ. Today, ECS
has twenty-eight attorneys, all dedicated to criminal enforcement,
and future growth of ECS to fifty or sixty attorneys is
contemplated.
United States Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) around the coun-
try are also actively prosecuting environmental crimes. USAOs in
Boston, Miami, San Diego and Buffalo, to name a few, have al-
ready formed their own environmental crimes units. More than
140 Assistant United States Attorneys and thirty-six United States
Attorneys at the recent convention attended the criminal enforce-
ment presentation organized by ECS, an indication that other ju-
risdictions may soon follow the lead of those cities which have
already created local criminal enforcement units.
Increases in the number of indictments and convictions, the
amount of fines and penalties, and length of prison terms im-
posed for environmental crimes all confirm the growth of envi-
ronmental criminal enforcement at the federal level. From the
beginning of fiscal year 1983 through fiscal year 1991, there have
been 571 individuals and 267 corporations indicted for environ-
mental crimes.3 With a number of those matters still pending,
there have been 409 individuals and 204 corporations convicted
through guilty pleas or trials.4 The conviction rate runs higher
than eighty percent. 5 More than $74.5 million in criminal fines
and penalties have been imposed (more than $60 million of that
2. See Former Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh, Address at 1991
Environmental Law Enforcement Conference (January 8, 1991) (transcript on
file with author).
3. See Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, paralegal, to Neil S. Cartus-
ciello, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section, United States Department of Jus-
tice (October 24, 1991) (on file with author).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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since October 1988), and more than 173 years of imprisonment
have been imposed (more than 110 of those years since October
1988).6 As these figures demonstrate, the central focus of many
environmental criminal investigations has been the identification
of high-level corporate officers responsible for the violations, a
manifestation of DOJ's long-held position that penalizing individ-
uals with jail time and heavy fines strongly deters environmental
violations. Put plainly, in DOJ's view, incarceration is the one
cost of doing business that cannot be passed along to the
consumer.
In addition to criminal enforcement efforts at the federal
level, both state and local prosecutors are actively prosecuting en-
vironmental crimes. New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Ohio have
well-organized, longstanding criminal enforcement programs. In
fact, New Jersey employs about half as many criminal investiga-
tors for state environmental crimes alone as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) employs for the entire country.7 More
than forty states now belong to four regional environmental en-
forcement organizations,8 partially funded by EPA for the pur-
pose of promoting state environmental criminal enforcement.
The National District Attorneys Association has formed an Envi-
ronmental Protection Subcommittee for the purpose of establish-
ing a central clearinghouse and training center to teach local
prosecutors how to prosecute environmental crimes. Local dis-
trict attorneys in California, Colorado and other states are bring-
ing successful prosecutions against both individuals and
corporations .9
6. Id.
7. EPA currently employs 62 environmental crimes investigators. Tele-
phone Interview with Howard Berman, Esq., Acting Deputy Director of Criminal
Enforcement Counsel Division within office of Criminal Enforcement of Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (February 18, 1992). New Jersey employs approx-
imately 35. Telphone Interview with Charles Davis, Press Spokesman for Office
of New Jersey Attorney General (February 10, 1992).
8. These are the Northeast Hazardous Waste Project, based in Trenton,
New Jersey, the Southern Environmental Enforcement Network, based in Mont-
gomery, Alabama, the Western States Hazardous Waste Project, based in Phoe-
nix, Arizona, and the Midwestern Environmental Enforcement Association,
based in Elgin, Illinois.
9. See e.g., California v. Marmon, No. 104552 (Super. Ct. Alameda County,
Jan. 10, 1991). Marmon pled no contest to charges of illegal transportation and
disposal of hazardous waste. The court sentenced him to 16 months in prison, a
$5,000 fine, and $39,000 restitution. See also California v. Federated Weiner
Metals, No. 89-M-06086 (Compton Mun. Ct. July 10, 1991). Federated Weiner
Metals, a metal recycling company, pled no contest to 32 misdemeanor viola-
tions of the state's lead standards. The company was ordered to contribute
$200,000 to a lead education program fund and was fined $25,000. See also Col-
1992]
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While numerous environmental criminal prosecutions at the
federal level have been aimed at small and mid-sized businesses, '0
the roster of companies charged with and/or convicted of envi-
ronmental crimes also contains a number of major corporations,
including Pillsbury, Orkin Exterminating, International Paper,
Marathon Oil, Exxon, Weyerhaeuser, Pennwalt, Nabisco, United
Technologies, Ocean Spray, Keebler, W.R. Grace and Ashland
Oil."I The types of businesses and industries which have been
investigated and prosecuted include shipbuilders, ship repair fa-
cilities, oil companies, oil refineries, gas and oil pipelines, chemi-
cal manufacturers and storage facilities, tanneries, wood
treatment facilities, electroplating operations, steel companies,
lumber companies, furniture strippers, barrel recycling opera-
tions, pesticide companies, demolition and asbestos removal
companies, food producers and processors, aircraft companies
and refinishers, companies dealing with the storage, treatment,
disposal and transportation of hazardous waste, real estate devel-
opers, automobile importers, sewage treatment plants, auto body
and repair shops, dairies, and dry cleaners.' 2
orado v. Adolph Coors Co., No. 90-M-3294 (Colorado County Ct. October 23,
1990). Coors pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges stemming from a contin-
ual discharge of contaminated water into a local stream. The company was fined
$200,000.
10. See e.g., United States v. Rutana, 932 F.2d 1155 (1991) (operator of
metal finishing plant); United States v. Dean, CR2-90-101 (E.D. Tenn. 1991)
(metal fabricating company); United States v. Collins, CR-88-A-0019-NE (N.D.
Ala. 1987); United States v. Nanticoke Homes Inc. of Greenwood Delaware, CR-
91-23-LON (D. Del. 1991) (prefabricated home manufacturer).
11. See, United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-15-CR (D. Alaska 1991)
(guilty plea); United States v. International Paper, CR-91-0005 I-B (D. Me. 1991)
(guilty plea); United States v. Marathon Oil Co., RT 91-68 CR (S.D. Ind. 1991)
(guilty plea); United States v. United Technologies, No. 2-91 CR-00028 (D.
Conn. 1991) (guilty plea); United States v. Weyerhaeuser, CR-90-00019 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) (guilty plea); United States v. Pillsbury Co., No. 90-05020-01-CR-
SW-4 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (guilty plea); United States v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
688 F. Supp. 223 (W.D. Va. 1988) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss in-
dictment); United States v. Pennwalt, CR-88-55T (W.D. Wash. 1988) (guilty
plea); United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa. 1989);
United States v. W.R. Grace, No. 88-2412K (D. Mass. 1987) (consent decree);
United States v. Keebler, No. 86-0401 (D. Colo. 1986) (guilty plea); United
States v. Nabisco, CR-86-41T (W.D. Wash. 1986) (guilty plea); United States v.
Ocean Spray, No. 85-909'(D. Mass. 1986) (guilty plea).
12. United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1989) (transporter of
hazardous waste); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991) (trans-
porter of hazardous waste); United States v. Protex, 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir.
1989) (barrel recycling); United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir.
1991) (municipal sewage treatment plants); United States v. Macdonald and
Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F. 2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991) (transporter and disposer of
hazardous waste); United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-15-CR (D. Alaska
1991) (oil company); United States v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 688 F. Supp.
4
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Legislative efforts in the area of criminal enforcement have
also intensified. Over the last ten years, Congress has enhanced
criminal penalties in the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA),' 3 the Clean Water Act, 14 the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), .5 and most recently the Clean Air Act (CAA),1 6 raising
misdemeanors to felonies. The Pollution Prosecution Act of
1990, signed by President Bush in November 1990, mandates the
expansion of EPA's cadre of criminal investigators. The EPA be-
gan with twenty-two criminal investigators in 1982. The Pollution
Prosecution Act requires an increase from the current number of
approximately sixty investigators, to more than 200 by October
1995.17 This number will be complemented by substantial re-
sources of the FBI, which already has more than 100 special
agents working on environmental criminal cases, and other fed-
eral agencies, including Customs, the Defense Criminal Investiga-
tive Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Coast Guard.
The impact of increased criminal enforcement in the environ-
mental arena is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the Exxon
case.' 8 Under the recently accepted plea bargain in the criminal
prosecution of Exxon Corporation and its subsidiary, Exxon
Shipping, for the oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, the
two companies will pay $25 million in fines for criminal misde-
meanors, as well as another $100 million to restore the Prince
William Sound. 19 These penalties are separate and apart from
the $1 billion that Exxon has already agreed to pay pursuant to a
223 (W.D. Va. 1988) (pesticide company); United States v. Derecktors Shipyard
Builders, 639 F. Supp. 1064 (D.R.I. 1986) (shipbuilders); United States v.
Nabisco, CR-86-41T (W.D. Wash. 1986) (food manufacturer and distributer).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988).
14. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988). During the 1990 debate over the Clean
Air Act Amendments, the regulated community for the first time sought to have
certain protective provisions for good faith, diligent efforts to comply with the
law included in the amendments to the criminal sections. Although the effort to
secure both statutory immunity for violations discovered and corrected as a re-
sult of internal environmental audits, and an evidentiary privilege for audit re-
ports, was unsuccessful, it signals increased activity by the regulated community
in the development of environmental legislation.
17. The Act, passed as a rider to H.R. 3338 (101st Cong.), authorizes EPA
to quadruple the size of the criminal enforcement program over a five-year pe-
riod. Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Stat. 2962,
Nov. 16, 1990, Title II, § 202.
18. See Exxon, No. A90-015 CR (D. Alaska 1991).
19. Id. (Plea Agreement).
1992]
5
Block: Environmental Criminal Enforcement in the 1990's
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
38 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. III: p. 33
civil consent decree with state and federal governments. 20
While the Exxon case set a record, fines exceeding the mil-
lion-dollar mark for environmental criminal convictions are be-
coming more common. 2' Hazardous waste cases under RCRA
illustrate this point. In the summer of 1990, Unichem Interna-
tional, Inc. pleaded guilty to a number of RCRA violations at its
Wyoming and New Mexico facilities and paid a record criminal
fine of $1.25 million.22 Less than a year later, United Technolo-
gies Corporation pleaded guilty to six RCRA felonies at its Sikor-
sky aircraft unit in Connecticut and agreed to pay a $3 million
criminal fine.23 And in July 1991, International Paper pleaded
guilty to RCRA violations at its Jay, Maine plant and agreed to
pay a $2.2 million fine. 24
Large fines are just one of the potential sanctions for envi-
ronmental criminal conduct. In addition to receiving fines, com-
panies and individuals convicted of violations under the Clean
Water Act and Clean Air Act are automatically "listed," i.e.,
banned from contracting with the government until the "condi-
tion(s) of noncompliance" that led to the criminal conviction is
remedied to the satisfaction of the EPA Assistant Administrator of
the Office of Enforcement.2 5 Under both statutes, listing is
mandatory upon conviction, although the ban applies only to the
facility at which the violation occurred, rather than to the entire
company.26 However, in the recent amendments to the Clean Air
Act, Congress granted the EPA Assistant Administrator discretion
to extend the ban to any or all of a company's other facilities.2 7
Due to EPA's broad ability to define the "condition(s) of non-
compliance," 28 its listing authority is a powerful enforcement
20. Summary of Action on Criminal Cases: Environmental Crimes Section
Dep't of Justice Press Release, October 15, 1991 (On file with author).
21. See, e.g., United States v. International Paper, CR-91-00051-B (D. Me.
1991) ($2.2 million); United States v. United Technologies, 2-91-CR-00028 (D.
Conn. 1991) ($3 million); United States v. Ashland Oil, CR-88-146 (W.D. Pa.
1989) ($2.25 million); United States v. U.S. Sugar, 91-8125CR-Paine ($3.75
million).
22. See United States v. Unichem Int'l, Inc., CR-90-057 (D. Wyo. 1990).
23. See United States v. United Technologies, No. 2-91-CR-00028 (D.
Conn. 1991).
24. United States v. International Paper, CR-91-00051-B (D. Me. 1991).
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (Clean Water Act) and implementing regulations
at 40 C.F.R. § 15; See 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (Clean Air Act) and implementing regu-
lations at 40 C.F.R. § 15.
26. See id. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1368 and implementing regulations at 40
C.F.R. § 15.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
28. See generally Jonathan S. Cole, EPA's Contractor Listing Program: A List You
6
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tool.29 For example, in one case, EPA determined that the funda-
mental condition of noncompliance leading to the conviction of
the violator, Valmont Industries, Inc., for false reporting under
the Clean Water Act, was the company's "bad corporate atti-
tude." 30 Although Valmont ultimately convinced EPA that it had
sufficiently rectified this condition, "corporate attitude" became
and remains one of the conditions of noncompliance upon which
listing may rest.
In addition to large fines and the prospect of being listed,
companies convicted of environmental crimes may also face sus-
pension and debarment from federal contracting.3' The suspen-
sion and debarment process differs in three fundamental ways
from the listing process under the Clean Water Act and Clean Air
Act. First, the decision whether to suspend and debar is totally
discretionary. 32 Second, it need not await a conviction-the de-
barment official can take action upon the return of a criminal in-
dictment before any trial or conviction. 33 Third, suspension and
debarment can result from criminal conduct under any environ-
mental statute, not just the Clean Water Act or Clean Air Act.3 4
EPA has its own suspension and debarment official who deter-
mines what action the federal government will take with respect
to federal contracts. In recent years, EPA has also coordinated its
efforts with the Department of Defense, the General Services Ad-
ministration, other federal government debarment officials, as
well as recent initiatives with the states. 35 Whereas several years
ago, few companies convicted of environmental crimes had to
worry seriously that the conviction would affect their ability to
contract with the federal government, the landscape is now
changing.3 6
Likewise, the landscape is changing with respect to sentenc-
Do Not Want To Make, 2 FED. FACILrTEs ENVrL.J. 129 (Summer 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Cole, Contractor Listing].
29. Id.
30. See In re Valmont Industries, Inc., EPA Contractor Listing Docket No.
07-89-L068 (January 12, 1990).
31. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.4 and 40 C.F.R. § 32.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Telephone Interview with Robert F. Meunier, Chief of Compliance
Branch, Environmental Protection Agency (February 20, 1992).
36. See, e.g., Cole, Contractor Listing, supra note 29.
1992]
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ing in environmental cases.3 7 The days of probation, or at worst,
a sixty-day sentence, are over, as corporate executives face the
increasing likelihood of not only substantial fines, but mandatory
jail time under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.38 Perhaps the
starkest example of this change can be seen in the criminal prose-
cutions of wetlands cases. Prior to the institution of the Guide-
lines in November 1987, the longest jail sentence imposed for a
wetlands violation was seven days.39 Since the Guidelines went
into effect, sentences of up to three years in prison have been
imposed for wetlands violations.40
Sentences for other Clean Water Act violations and for haz-
ardous waste disposal violations have increased even more drasti-
cally. In Massachusetts, seventy year-old John Borowski was
convicted of knowing endangerment under the Clean Water Act
for allowing employees at his metal-plating shop to dump nitric
acid and other toxic wastes into the sewer and for failing to pro-
vide them with any safety equipment. 4 1 Borowski was sentenced
to twenty-six months in jail.42 In South Carolina, the head of a
sewage treatment plant was convicted of making false statements
on discharge monitoring reports and sentenced to thirty-three
months injail.43 In Erwin, Tennessee, the production manager of
the General Fabricators Plant was convicted of five RCRA storage
and disposal counts for ordering employees to bury hazardous
waste in a pit behind the plant and to discharge hazardous waste-
waters to an unlined lagoon on the property. On August 5, 1991,
the manager was sentenced to forty months in prison.44 Addi-
tionally, an appellate court recently upheld a prison sentence of
forty-one months for the illegal disposal of hazardous waste by a
transporter in Mississippi. 4 5
Sentences for companies are also becoming more severe.46
On November 1, 1991, the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion's new guidelines for organizations became effective. 47 The
37. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (West 1992) (hereinafter
Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
38. Id.
39. United States v. Bieri, 87-CR-20030 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
40. United States v. Pozsqai, CR. 88-00450-01 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
41. United States v. Borowski, CR. 89-256 (D. Mass. 1990).
42. Id.
43. United States v. Irby, CR. 90-180 (D.S.C. 1990).
44. United States v. Dean, CR2-90-101, (E.D. Tenn. 1991).
45. United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991).
46. See, e.g., Federal Sentencing Guidelines, § 8B1.1.
47. Id.
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/2
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1990's
new guidelines mandate that the sentencing judge order restitu-
tion except in limited circumstances. 48 In environmental cases,
this raises the question as to whether courts will order restitution
for damage to natural resources. The new guidelines further re-
quire the sentencing judge to issue remedial orders and to seek
assistance from EPA in structuring the remedies in environmental
criminal cases. 49
The guidelines also require the court to impose probation if
a company does not already have an "effective program to pre-
vent and detect violations of law."'50 The new guidelines detail
the elements of such a program, effectively creating a blueprint of
the type of compliance audit the government will likely expect
companies to implement. 5 1 The conditions of probation set forth
in the guidelines may also include unannounced inspections of
appropriate books and records, or require the convicted company
to place advertisements in newspapers and other media acknowl-
edging its guilt. 52
III. ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
Voluntary environmental auditing is one measure that a com-
48. Id.
49. Id. § 8B1.2
50. Id. § 8Dl.l(a)(3).
51. Id. § 8AI.2 (Application Note K). An "effective program" would in-
clude: (1) establishing compliance standards and procedures reasonably capa-
ble of reducing the prospect of criminal conduct; (2) making sure that specific
individuals within its high level personnel are assigned responsibility for the rel-
evant area of conduct, e.g., environmental compliance; (3) exercising due care
not to delegate responsibility to irresponsible individuals; (4) communicating
the standards and procedures effectively by training practical publications that
workers can understand; (5) making sure that the company is actually achieving
compliance by establishing an effective monitoring and auditing system that
would include a "hotline" reporting system for employees to use; (6) setting in
place appropriate internal disciplinary mechanisms; and (7) after an offense is
detected, responding appropriately to prevent future offenses. Id.
52. Id. § 8D1.4(a), (b)(2). An example of such an advertisement appeared
in a Wilmington, North Carolina newspaper on March 23, 1989 and reads as
follows:
WE APOLOGIZE FOR POLLUTING THE ENVIRONMENT
General Wood Preserving Company recently pled guilty in federal
court to illegally disposing of hazardous waste in 1985 at its plant in
Leland, North Carolina. As a result of that crime, General Wood Pre-
serving was fined $150,000, and was ordered to publish this advertise-
ment. We are sorry for what we did, and we hope that our experience
will be a lesson to others that environmental laws must be respected.
Board of Directors
General Wood Preserving Co., Inc.
WILMINGTON MORNING STAR, March 23, 1989 at 10B.
1992]
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pany can take to reduce the risk of criminal and civil exposure.
Not only does discovering and correcting environmental
problems by means of a voluntary compliance program make
good business sense, it may also be a means of convincing the
government not to pursue a matter criminally.53
Congress has considered a number of measures which would
mandate that companies convicted of environmental criminal vio-
lations conduct compliance audits to ensure that the violations
are not repeated. 54 The Federal Omnibus Violent Crime Control
Act of 1991, 5 5 which was passed by the Senate, had included an
amendment requiring any organization convicted of an environ-
mental felony to hire an independent auditor to conduct an envi-
ronmental compliance audit.5 6 The House of Representatives
passed a aversion of the crimes measure in October 1991 without
the audit amendment, 57 and the amendment has been deleted by
a joint conference committee, 58 in effect killing the measure.
Additionally, on July 1, 1991, the Environment and Natural
Resources Division of DOJ published a memorandum containing
guidelines on prosecutorial discretion in environmental criminal
cases where the violator has made voluntary disclosure, cooper-
ated with regulatory authorities and/or implemented a system of
environmental compliance auditing or other compliance monitor-
ing systems. 59 While the guidelines are merely a directive for fed-
eral prosecutors and create no additional rights for those in the
regulated community, they do indicate that in appropriate cases,
companies may potentially avoid criminal prosecution for serious
environmental offenses when they have made their best efforts to
prevent and detect such violations.
IV. PROVING ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
Because environmental crimes are considered health and
welfare offenses, the government's burden of proof is substan-
53. See generally AUDITING IN CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL Fo-
RUM 36-43 (Jan.-Feb. 1992).
54. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
55. S. 1241, 102nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1991).
56. Id.
57. H.R. 3371, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
58. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 405, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
59. See United States Department ofJustice, Factors in Decisions on Crimi-
nal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Vol-
untary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator (July 1, 1991) (on file
with author).
10
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tially easier to meet than it is in the prosecution of more tradi-
tional crimes. 60 In criminal cases which potentially affect the
health and welfare of the general public, the government must
prove only the general intent of the violator to commit the acts
charged, as opposed to specific intent to engage in unlawful con-
duct.6 1 Thus, where the offense requires "knowing" conduct, the
government may prove the defendant's knowledge simply by
showing that the action was not done by accident or mistake. 62
For example, to obtain a conviction for illegal disposal of hazard-
ous waste, the government need only prove that the defendant
knowingly buried drums containing solvents and degreasers and
knew of the contents' potential for harm. The government need
not prove that the defendant knew the contents of the drums
were listed as hazardous waste, that he knew he needed a permit,
or that he intended to violate the law.63
Two developing legal doctrines have also facilitated the gov-
ernment's ability to prove environmental crimes. The first is the
responsible corporate officer doctrine.64 The government has ar-
gued that the responsible corporate officer doctrine, derived from
two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Park,65 and United States
v. Dotterweich,66 holds that (1) a corporate officer, (2) who is di-
rectly responsible within the management scheme for the conduct
60. United States v. International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558 (1971); United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Dotterweich involved the liability of
Buffalo Pharmacal Company and its president for violations of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1938)). 320 U.S. at 278. The
Court described the standard under the Act for proving wrongdoing as follows:
"Such legislation disposes with the conventional requirement for criminal con-
duct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts
the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger." Id. at 281. See also United States v.
Hayes Int'l, Inc., 786 F.2d 1499 (lth Cir. 1986).
61. See United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1984); United States v.
Hayes International, Inc., 786 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986); see also United States
v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) cert. denied 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); see also
United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990) cert. denied 1991 U.S. Lexis
1605 (March 18, 1991).
62. See, e.g., Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1503. The statute at issue in the
Hayes International case, § 6928 of CERCLA, "is not drafted in a manner which
makes knowledge of illegality an element of the offense." Id. The court also
found that § 6928(d)(1) was "a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regu-
lated area with great ramifications for the public health and safety." Id.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Baytank (Houston) Inc., 934 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.
1991).
64. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
65. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
66. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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in question, and (3) knew that the type of improper activity al-
leged was occurring, may be held criminally liable for environ-
mental crimes committed by his subordinates.67 It is not clearly
established, however, .that the responsible corporate officer doc-
trine dispenses with the requirement of actual knowledge. In
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. ,68 for example,
the trial court had instructed the jury that if the defendant, the
head of the corporation, met the three criteria set forth above, it
could find the defendant liable for a known violation under
RCRA, even absent proof of his actual knowledge of the specific
violation. 69 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that guilty knowledge could not be inferred. 70 However, in
United States v. Brittain,71 the court noted in dicta that under the
Clean Water Act, "a 'responsible corporate officer,' to be crimi-
nally liable, would not have to 'willfully or negligently' cause a
permit violation. Instead, the willfulness or negligence of the ac-
tor would be imputed to him by virtue of his position of responsi-
bility."' 72 While the scope of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine remains uncertain, government prosecutors will con-
tinue to argue that corporate officers should be held criminally
responsible for the misconduct of those who work under their su-
pervision although their knowledge of such conduct is minimal.
The second doctrine which helps the government prove
criminal conduct is the doctrine of collective corporate knowl-
edge. 73 Under this doctrine, the government may prove the col-
lective knowledge of the company to commit an environmental
violation by proving that certain employees took the requisite ac-
tions and that other employees possessed the requisite mens rea,
even where it cannot prove that any single employee both took
the requisite action and had sufficient intent.74 The combined
use of the collective knowledge doctrine and the longstanding
rule of corporate criminal liability-that a company may be held
criminally liable for the acts of an employee acting within the
scope of his duties, no matter how low he is in the chain of com-
67. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d
35, 50-51 (1st Cir. 1991).
68. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
69. Id. at 50.
70. Id.
71. 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 1419.
73. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
74. Id. at 856.
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mand-make the threat of corporate criminal prosecution decid-
edly real.75
The expansion of legal doctrines which ease the govern-
ment's burden of proving knowledge or intent has been accompa-
nied by an increase in the number of environmental criminal
provisions requiring a lower threshold of mens rea. The Clean
Water Act, and now the Clean Air Act, for example, both contain
criminal misdemeanor provisions which require the government
to prove only negligent conduct. 76 As both the Ashland Oil and
Exxon prosecutions 77 demonstrate, the impact of a conviction for
an environmental misdemeanor should not be underestimated.
Penalties for such negligent conduct can, in some instances, actu-
ally exceed those for knowing or intentional conduct.78
V. CONCLUSION
Each of the developments discussed above augurs an in-
crease in environmental criminal enforcement efforts in the
1990's. As enforcement efforts have expanded, the regulated
community has become increasingly vocal in its call for protective
measures to guard against what it views as arbitrary decision-mak-
ing regarding which violations are selected for criminal prosecu-
tion rather than administrative or civil enforcement. A number of
developments, such as DOJ's recently published memorandum
on voluntary disclosure, 79 and the provision in the new sentenc-
ing guidelines on effective compliance programs,80 suggest that a
balance may be reached which continues to punish misconduct
but also begins to reward good faith efforts to achieve environ-
mental compliance.
75. One issue which escaped public attention in the criminal prosecution of
Exxon Corporation for the Exxon Valdez oil spill was that the government in-
dicted both the company that owned and operated the Exxon Valdez oil tanker,
Exxon Shipping Company, and also the parent company, Exxon Corporation.
This is a relatively novel proposition in criminal law and was seriously chal-
lenged by the company in pre-trial motions to dismiss. The government did not
base its right to prosecute on an alter ego theory, but rather, on a theory of
criminal agency.
76. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (1991).
77. United States v. Ashland Oil Inc., 88-146 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Exxon, A-90-
015-CR.
78. Alternative Fines Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).
79. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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